Online Journal of Space Communication
Volume 3
Issue 6 Satellite Security (Winter 2004)

Article 6

June 2021

International Guidelines for the Preservation of Space as a Unique
Resource
Phillip D. Anz-Meador

Follow this and additional works at: https://ohioopen.library.ohio.edu/spacejournal
Part of the Astrodynamics Commons, Navigation, Guidance, Control and Dynamics Commons, Space
Vehicles Commons, Systems and Communications Commons, and the Systems Engineering and
Multidisciplinary Design Optimization Commons

Recommended Citation
Anz-Meador, Phillip D. (2021) "International Guidelines for the Preservation of Space as a Unique
Resource," Online Journal of Space Communication: Vol. 3 : Iss. 6 , Article 6.
Available at: https://ohioopen.library.ohio.edu/spacejournal/vol3/iss6/6

This Articles is brought to you for free and open access by the OHIO Open Library Journals at OHIO Open Library. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Online Journal of Space Communication by an authorized editor of OHIO Open
Library. For more information, please contact deborded@ohio.edu.

Anz-Meador: International Guidelines for the Preservation of Space as a Uniqu

International Guidelines for the Preservation of
Space as a Unique Resource
Phillip D. Anz-Meador, Ph.D.
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Dept. of Physics
Abstract
Introduction
The non-benign nature of spaceflight had been recognized well before the first
on-board sensors detected the van Allen radiation belts about the Earth or
piezoelectric sensors, meant to measure strain and flexure within the structure of
a rocket or spacecraft, first noted the impacts of micrometeoroids on the craft
(Explorer 1, Alexander, personal comm.). Indeed, the recognition that
meteoroids were “burning” in the upper atmosphere implied the requirement of a
source of particles to burn, hence the studies of both photographic and
radar/radio meteors. Observations of the sun, as well as such terrestrial
phenomena as the Aurora Borealis and Australis, and such celestial phenomena
as comets, asteroids, and the faint reflection provided by the meteoroid complex
(the so-called “Zodiacal light”), provided further evidence, if needed, as to the
significant constituents (and potential hazards) in the space environment.
Means of protecting spacecraft from this natural environment were required, and
a significant amount of laboratory and on-orbit testing was conducted in order to
protect and preserve spacecraft functions. Almost all measures were passive in
nature, e.g. shielding was deployed to protect electronics from cosmic rays and
micrometeoroids, designs were optimized to prevent static discharge, and “radhard” (radiation hardened) electronics were developed to cope with the ambient
radiation environment. Time passed, and space became a place to explore, to
do business, and to protect global security.
During that time, an appreciation of the many and varied components of the
space environment grew. A large body of literature developed to characterize,
explain, and predict the effect of the ambient environment upon spacecraft and
space materials. It is not the intent of this paper to review that portion of the
environment.
The near static nature of some of the components was noted, as well as the
dynamic nature of others. Yet this was not the only categorization possible. For
example, some (notably Mr. John Gabbard) noticed oddities in the catalogs of
space objects tracked by the North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORADCOM). Certainly it wasn’t common knowledge that not only had we
launched the LANDSAT 1 spacecraft aboard a Delta rocket, but evidently
hundreds of other small objects with this launch. Further analysis indicated that
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these objects were debris associated with the accidental fragmentation of the
Delta’s second stage. Again, time passed. Military tests were conducted in
space, including intentional explosions and collisions, and the list of accidental
explosions grew.
Debris began to accumulate and, with a maturity of thought not present at the
dawn of the Space Age, scientists and engineers in the United States came to
realize that spacecraft must not only be protected from the “natural” environment
on-orbit, but also the induced, or “man-made” environment. Finally, a burgeoning
sense of environmental stewardship led to the modern international consensus
that not only must spacecraft be protected from their environment, but that same
environment must be protected from spacecraft.
This, then, is the subject of this paper: what is being done to protect spacecraft
from the macroparticle (to include both anthropogenic debris and meteoroids)
environment, and what is being done to protect the environment from man’s
presence. Only a holistic view of these processes can ensure a future
environment safe for its navigation and capable of sustaining continued growth
and exploitation of the unique natural resource offered us by space. Thus, in this
paper we shall review the international guidelines being formulated to protect
both spacecraft and the environment. To place these in context for the general
reader, we shall start by providing an overview of the current space environment
and environmental effects upon spacecraft.
Environmental Overview
The man-made space environment
The man-made component of the overall space environment is usually
categorized into five types of objects, and as well by the object’s active or
inactive status. The five types are spacecraft or payloads, rocket bodies or
rocket boosters, operational debris, fragmentation debris, and anomalous debris.
To be more explicit, we may define the types as follows:
•

Spacecraft or payloads: active or inactive (in storage, or derelict) vehicles
or objects whose purpose was the primary goal of their respective launch.
While the term “spacecraft” is usually reserved for relatively complex
vehicles, the broader term “payloads” describes all levels of sophistication,
including such inert objects as calibration spheres and dipoles.

•

Rocket bodies (or boosters; usually abbreviated as “R/B”): these vehicles
provide the means of launch, orbital transfer, and orbital insertion to the
payloads. Thrust is provided by liquid fuel engines, solid fuel motors, or
gaseous and/or electric/ionic thrusters. Size ranges from over ten meters
in length (e.g. the Commonwealth of Independent State’s [CIS] Zenit, or
SL-16 [US Dept. of Defense designation], R/B) to small ullage motors
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used to settle liquid propellants and ejected by the CIS Proton’s (SL-12)
fourth stage.
•

Operational debris: debris released during stage separation, payload
deployment, or payload operations. These may include, respectively,
straps and bolts; adapters, clamp bands, and spin/de-spin weights (“yo”
weights); and retention or hold-down straps and radiator or sensor covers.

•

Fragmentation debris: debris created during the planned or accidental
explosion of, or collision between, payloads and/or R/B. Though not
cataloged due to their size, debris produced by collisions of small objects
with large targets could logically fit into this category.

•

Anomalous debris: debris created by unknown means, usually long after
payload deployment or end-of-mission. While the majority of instances
have produced one or two anomalous objects, some (such as the Cosmic
Background Explorer [COBE] or the SNAPSHOT nuclear reactor-powered
test satellite). It has been suggested (Johnson, N., personal comm.) that
while fragmentation debris are a measure of space traffic’s effect upon the
environment, anomalous debris may be a measure of the environment’s
effect upon resident space objects.

The approximate distribution of objects by type is depicted in Fig. 1; the reader
should note that these objects are exclusively 10 cm (approximately) and larger
in size, and are cataloged using ground-based sensors.
In addition to those
debris objects
anomalous debris
produced as a
1.33%
satellite undergoes a
fragmentation,
payloads
31.02%
debris have been
fragmentation
identified as
debris
38.07%
belonging to solid
rocket motor (SRM)
exhaust compounds
(Al2O3) and paint
pigments (surface
rocket bodies
degradation
17.95%
operational debris
products). In the
11.63%
case of Aluminum
Oxides, the Explorer
Fig. 1. Objects by type.
46 meteoroid survey
satellite observed,
with 95% confidence, a correlation between SRM firings and an increase in the
incident, directional flux within 20 days of the firing//7//. Such time-sequenced
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events may have been observed by the Long Duration Exposure Facility’s
Interplanetary Dust Experiment//8// and the SkiYMET meteor radars (Ref. X3) as
well. Both exhaust products and paint pigments have been identified by
scanning electron microscopy and elemental analysis in impact crater residue.
Human biological wastes have also been identified by this technique//9//, though
these particulates should normally be confined to altitudes below about 400 km,
the maximum altitude of most manned missions.
Degradation debris have also been measured on-orbit. Also referred to as local
contamination, these debris tend to be most prevalent during the first weeks or
months of operations; as such, they are similar to “out gassing” effects (Ref. X2).
Once classified by general type, a second objective method of characterizing the
man-made population is by size and mass. The following table (after Ref. X4,
with updated information) portrays the gross distribution of resident space objects
in size and mass.
NUMBER OF
% NUMBER
% MASS
OBJECTS
0.1 – 1.0
35,000,000
99.67
0.035
1.0 – 10.0
110,000
0.31
0.035
> 10.0
8000
0.02
99.93
TOTAL:
35,118,000
100.0
1,400,000 kg
Table I. A statistical breakdown of the on-orbit man-made population. The total
percent mass represents that fraction of a total estimated mass loading of
1,400,000 kg; this figure is based upon the NASA space traffic model and the
Dept. of Defense Space Control Center (SCC) catalog.
SIZE [cm]

The categorization by size is not coincidentally broken out in decades of size;
objects greater than approximately 10 cm (in low Earth orbit, or LEO) are
observed by ground-based sensors, tracked and correlated, and cataloged by
agencies performing the space surveillance mission worldwide. Those between
1 and 10 cm may be observed by special radars during statistical data collection
campaigns, while those smaller are rarely observed. Rather, objects smaller
than 1 mm are typically assessed by counting the number of impact features on
surfaces exposed to, and returned from, space.
Yet another means of characterizing the environment is by the spatial density S,
i.e. the number of equivalent objects per cubic kilometer. This quantity, derived
in a manner analogous to that in the classical theory of gasses, is of great utility
as it may be related to both the flux F and the expected collision rate C:
F = S⋅v [impacts/m2/year]
and
C = F⋅A = S⋅v⋅A [impacts/year],
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where v is the relative velocity between an object (the “target”) and the impactor
(the “projectile”) and A is the area (cross-sectional or surface area) of the target
object. The incident flux represents the number of particles striking a surface
within a given time; the flux is usually expressed in units of [impacts/m2/yr], but
may appear in other units. An excellent analogue for the flux is the amount of
water falling on the windshield of a vehicle driving through a rainstorm. The final
amount will depend upon the size of the raindrops, or the distribution in size, the
velocity of the drops, and the velocity of the vehicle as it drives through the
storm.
The following figures (after Ref. X5) depict the spatial density of cataloged (> 10
cm in LEO, > approximately 1 m in Geosynchronous Earth orbit, or GEO) objects
in LEO and deep space. The reader may mentally multiply the LEO figures by a
factor of 300, and the GEO figure by a factor of 50, to obtain the flux at these
altitudes.
3.0E-08

payloads
rocket bodies

2.5E-08

spatial density [1/km3]

operational debris
2.0E-08

fragmentation debris
anomalous debris

1.5E-08

TOTAL

1.0E-08

5.0E-09

0.0E+00
0

200

400
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800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

altitude [km]

Fig. 2. The spatial density of equivalent satellite objects in LEO.
Altitude divided into 10 km wide altitude bins. Spatial density portrayed on a
linear vertical axis to emphasize altitudes of high absolute concentration.
In Figure 2, perhaps the most prominent features are the “spikes” event just
below 800 km altitude, and just above 1400 km altitude. These result from the
relatively dense packing of specific spacecraft in the Iridium and Globalstar
commercial communication satellite constellations, respectively.
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Fig. 3. The spatial density of equivalent satellite objects in LEO.
Altitude divided into 10 km wide altitude bins. Spatial density portrayed on a
logarithmic vertical axis to emphasize distribution by type, altitude, and
concentration. Concentration of anomalous debris around 1300 km altitude due
to the SNAPSHOT satellite.
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Fig. 4. The spatial density of equivalent objects in deep space (here, defined as
altitudes above LEO and below GEO). Altitude in 100 km bins. Readily evident
are the US and Russian navigation satellite constellations in middle Earth orbit.
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Fig. 5. The spatial density of equivalent objects near GEO. Altitude in 100 km
bins. “High” and “Low” boundaries define a nominal GEO operational region.
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Because these figures only portray those objects capable of being cataloged
(with certain exclusions for national security), it is important to recall that these
are larger than approximately 10 cm in LEO and larger than 1 m in GEO.
Whereas the LEO region is believed to be reasonably complete, this is not the
case in deep space, and GEO in particular. Recent measurements (Ref. X6)
indicate that a significant population of objects larger than 10 cm reside in the
GEO belt. One reason for this may lie in a historical undercounting of objects
(primarily operational debris) released in the GEO belt. For example, objects
such as solar array retention straps have not been cataloged for many historical
payloads. Unrecognized fragmentations may also have contributed to the GEO
local environment. Thus, the GEO environment portrayed in Fig. 5 may
substantially be undercounting the actual spatial density/flux.
While these charts depict the distribution of cataloged objects, they are not
directly translatable to either a “high quality” flux or a collision rate. In the case of
a flux, this is because the relative velocity between two objects depends on the
actual orbital properties of the pair of objects involved in any prospective
collision. For objects whose orbital planes are randomly distributed with respect
to each other and the remainder of the population, these are:
•
•

the apogee (maximum altitude) and perigee (minimum altitude) of each
object in the pair; and
the inclination (the angle between the orbit plane and the Earth’s equator)
of each object.

Apogee/perigee altitudes determine the velocity, as a function of altitude, of each
of the individual objects. For circular orbits, as are the majority in LEO, MEO,
and GEO, the orbital velocities of both objects are roughly equal, and collisions
on the front and sides surfaces of the “target” object are prevalent. However, if
one object is in an elliptical orbit (i.e. a large difference in perigee and apogee
altitudes), then (a) the elliptical orbit, at perigee, may be traveling up to 3 km/s
faster than the other object, and (b) the object in the elliptical orbit may therefore
“catch up” with the other object and strike it from “behind”. This is observed onorbit, as shuttles and other spacecraft flying at 28° inclinations commonly return
with a multitude on craters on their rearward-oriented surfaces. The inclination is
also an important determinant of the outcome of any collision, as certain
inclination allow for “head on” collisions at up to 14-15 km/s. Conversely, the
uniformly low inclinations found in GEO, along with the coordinated motion of the
objects there, tends to lower the relative velocities possible.
Another factor contributing to the calculation of collision rate is the relative crosssectional area of projectiles and targets. While Figures 2 and 3 indicate two
roughly equivalent peaks in spatial density at around 800-1000 km and 14001500 km altitude, more collisions are expected to take place at the lower altitude.
This is because the objects resident at and about that altitude are significantly
larger (many being derelict SL-16 R/B), and hence present more “target area”,
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than are the spacecraft around 1400-1500 km altitude. This has been confirmed
by high fidelity long-term computer modeling of the evolution of the environment.
Computer models, based on measurements of the environment (including the
analysis of objects returned from space), are used to project an “average”
environment due to objects smaller than those depicted in Figures 2-5.
AVERAGE CROSS SECTIONAL FLUX VS. SIZE

1000
100
10
1
0.1
0.01
0.001
0.0001
1e-005

cum. cross-sect. flux (obj/m^2/yr)

1e-006

Fig. 6: The modeled environment for 1 mm-1 m impactors; target orbit is 400 km
circular, 51.6° inclination (similar to the ISS nominal orbit).
1e-007

Figure 6 depicts1e-006
the output
NASA
ORDEM2000
model
1e-005of the
0.0001
0.001
0.01
0.1computer
1
10 (Ref. X7).
As may be seen, the cumulative flux due to the debris population 1 mm and
Diameter (m) larger than the cataloged population.
larger in size is five (5) orders of magnitude
Effects upon spacecraft
As of this writing (November 2003), there has been only one (1) recognized
accidental collision between cataloged objects: the French Cerise satellite’s
gravity gradient stabilization boom was cut by a piece of French debris produced
by the 1986 fragmentation of an Ariane R/B third stage. All other historical
(alleged) collisions were conducted as military anti-satellite or ballistic missile
defense tests. The vast majority of fragmentations have been accidental
explosions.
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These explosions range in severity from mission survivable (e.g. a battery box
explosion aboard the NOAA 8 spacecraft) to the catastrophic, in which a body is
totally destroyed in the blast. Therefore, this section will concentrate on the
effects of impacts on spacecraft.
A qualitative assessment of impact effects is provided in the following table, after
Ref. X1.
DIAMETER OF IMPACTOR [cm]
< 0.01

EFFECT
Surface erosion
Potentially serious damage to
< 0.1
spacecraft
Equivalent to being struck by a
0.3 at 10 km/s relative velocity
bowling ball traveling at 60 mph
(typical in low Earth orbit)
(88 ft/s)
Equivalent to being struck by a
1.0 at 10 km/s relative velocity
400 lb safe traveling at 60 mph
Table II. Effects of particles of a given size upon spacecraft surfaces.

It is illustrative in a quantitative sense to examine the dependency of the
probability of impact or penetration upon environmental and physical variables.
Environmental variables are those dependent upon the orbital characteristics of
the target (and projectile) objects, such as the relative velocity between the two;
physical variables include the mass densities of the materials constituting the two
objects.
The effect of the incident flux may be characterized by the Poisson probability of
one or more (n ≥ 1) impacts of size ‘d’ and larger is:

-ÚÚF•dA⋅dv

Pn≥1(d) = 1 - e

,

where F(d,v) is the size and velocity-dependent flux, dA is the differential unit of
surface area, n is the number of impacts, and integrals are performed over both
surface area and the velocity distribution.
A common figure of merit for estimating the hazard to spacecraft (for example, in
calculations performed for the International Space Station [ISS] and the space
shuttle fleet) is the probability of no penetration, or PNP. The PNP may be
expressed using the Poisson statistic P0 = exp(-N), where:
N µ va⋅¶(v)⋅Tb⋅(cosq)g⋅rth⋅rpz⋅A⋅t .
The variable T is the surface thickness, q is the impact angle measured from
surface normal, v is the relative velocity, ¶(v) is the fraction of velocities between
v and v + dv, r is a mass density, A is the area of the exposed surface, and t is
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the elapsed time of exposure. The subscripts ‘t’ and ‘p’ refer to target and
projectile, respectively, and the set (a,b,g,h,z) are, in general, non-integer rational
numbers. Additional dependencies relating to target yield and tensile
strengths//12// or other material characteristics//13// may be manifest. Multi-layer
shielding and body self-shielding can modify these relations.
Impacts in MEO and GEO occur at correspondingly lower velocities. However,
even in GEO, the average relative velocity is on the order of 500 m/s, with a
maximum around 1.5 km/s. As such, and to apply a terrestrial measure, these
are commensurate with being struck by either “standard” or “high velocity”
ammunition.
While the debris population accounts for roughly half of all objects tracked and
cataloged by the US, simple calculations reveal that the impact rate of these
cataloged objects onto a one m2 target, per year, is minuscule. However, small
untracked debris do present a meaningful hazard to spacecraft because of
accelerated aging of spacecraft components, degradation of sensitive surfaces
such as mirrors, optical surfaces, radiators, and solar panels, and the potential
for a ‘mission kill’ should a single-point failure mode be susceptible to impact by
small debris. The STS-50 mission provides an example of component
degradation//4//, as segments of the radiator assembly were required to be
replaced following approximately 10 days of flight with the payload bay facing in
the direction of the velocity vector (the so-called “ram” direction). Shuttle flight
deck windows are also replace with a frequency of (on average) one outer pane
per mission. High pressure propellant lines, pressurized storage vessels, and
exposed cable bundles provide additional examples of single-point failure mode
elements on small spacecraft.
An Orbital Debris Bibliography
Since a paper of this nature cannot review all aspects of the orbital debris
hazard, the reader is referred to Appendix A. This appendix consists of a
bibliography of salient papers and books discussing man-made debris and the
space environment.
International Activities to Preserve the Space Environment
The preceding discussion summarizes the current (2003) understanding of the
man-made orbital debris environment. This understanding forms the basis of the
international consensus regarding the space environment, and the reader is
referred to Ref. X7A for a chronology of the development of that consensus
within the US government and its efforts in the commercial and international
space communities. This “consciousness raising”, begun at NASA Johnson
Space Center (JSC) in the late 1970s, has today led to an international
consensus among the international space agencies, intergovernmental
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organizations (e.g. the European Meteorological Satellite organization,
EuMetSat), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs, e.g. INTELSAT).
The year 1993 was a watershed year for orbital debris studies. In April of that
year, representatives of the major space faring powers met in Darmstadt,
Germany, in order to formalize a working agreement and terms of reference for
the interchange of technical information on orbital debris; this group formed the
basis of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC). The
current structure of the IADC is presented in Figure 7.

Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee
(IADC)

IADC Steering Group (SG)

Measurements Working Group (WG1)

Modeling & Databases (WG2)

Protection (WG3)

Mitigation (WG4)

Fig. 7: IADC member and component structure.
Current members include ASI (Italy), the British National Space Centre (BNSC,
UK), CNES (France), the Chinese National Space Agency (CNSA, People’s
Republic of China), the German Aerospace Center (DLR), the European Space
Agency (ESA), the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), Japan, NASA,
the National Space Agency of Ukraine (NSAU), and Rosaviakosmos (RKA of the
CIS). The NASA delegation incorporates NASA, DoD, Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), and other US Government agency activities. Canada and
Brazil have enjoyed observer status at recent meetings of the IADC.
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In June 1993, a meeting on orbital debris was held at the United Nations (UN).
At this meeting, the subject of orbital debris was introduced onto the agenda of
the UN’s Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) Science &
Technology Subcommittee (STSC). The UN COPUOS has become a valued
partner to the IADC’s activities and in 2004 will begin monitoring several
voluntary debris-reduction compliance activities of the IADC’s member agencies.
In response to an increased awareness of the hazards posed spacecraft
operations by the orbital debris environment, as well as the environmental impact
of accidental and intentional explosions, collisions, and other events depositing
materials into the environment, the international space agencies have begun to
codify their requirements on the manufacturers and owner/operators.
Specifically, these requirements have taken the form of national (or otherwise
“local”) handbooks of regulations. While these are generally similar in scope and
content, it is useful to review their general construction and requirements prior to
the activities of the IADC.
Regulatory Activities

Technological Activities
Under the auspices of the IADC, the general program of debris-related activities
has coalesced around four major activities. These are measurement of the
environment, modeling, protection, and mitigation. The first two activities are
focused on assessing the current environment and enabling the user community
to make reasonable projections into the future. This is essential, as it allows
trade studies to be made of various protection and mitigation strategies.
Protection activities are oriented towards protecting the spacecraft from the
environment, whereas mitigation activities are dedicated efforts to protect the
environment from the man-made orbital population. Each activity is discussed in
detail below.
Measurement
Measurement activities are of fundamental importance to characterizing the
current environment, as well as monitoring the environment over time in order to
assess either growth or, ideally, a reduction in the number of particles in the
environment. There are two primary methods by which the environment is
measured: ground-based (and recently, space-based) remote sensing and in
situ measurements. The latter may be divided into those materials which have
been returned from orbit and analyzed in the laboratory for their serendipitous
information content, and dedicated flights of impact sensors.
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Ground- and space-based remote sensing of the environment requires a
substantial national investment in the means. Historically, space surveillance
was driven by the need to distinguish a ballistic missile attack from the population
of Earth orbital objects during the Cold War for early warning, cueing anti-ballistic
missile (ABM) systems, and impact point prediction. For that reason, only the
United States and Soviet Union (and its successor, the Commonwealth of
Independent States) have fielded comprehensive space surveillance systems
and networks. These are discussed at length in Appendix B in terms of sensors,
capabilities, data reduction, data products, and their general availability.
The space surveillance networks are limited in many ways. For example, the
geographical distribution of sensors provided both limitations in surveillance and
opportunities for unobserved maneuvers and other on-orbit operations to be
conducted. For our purposes, however, the physics of the sensors involved was
the primary limiting factors as to their usefulness. In low Earth orbit, the smallest
observable object is generally considered to be on the order of 10 cm (4 inches)
in size. Unfortunately, the most statistically likely impactors are well below that
size. Select sensors can measure the environment to smaller sizes (in the case
of the US’ Long Range Imaging Radar [LRIR] in Massachusetts, down to about 5
mm). Indeed, a significant amount of information on the small particle
environment has been collected by the LRIR and the co-located NASA/DoD
Haystack Auxiliary (HAX) radar, as well as the German FGAN [q.v.] and others.
These data have been essential in the formulation of modern engineering models
of the space environment in LEO. However, these sensors are limited in terms of
field of view, resource allocation, and budget. Hence, the need to develop other
means of sensing the small particle environment.
The USSR and its follow-on states have flown micrometeoroid (and inclusively,
debris) experiments aboard the “Nauka” piggyback scientific modules of the socalled third generation photo-reconnaissance Cosmos-series satellites. These
data led to the development of the Soviet-era GOCT (GOST, or State Planning
Commission) model, which contained three components: sporadic “background”
meteoroids, meteoroid streams/showers, and what were assessed to be
meteoroids in Earth orbit. This latter population is, rather, indicative of manmade clouds of orbital debris. Witness plates (passive plates of various
materials which provide information via the cratering record on their surfaces)
have also been flown aboard the Salyut (USSR/France) series and Mir
(France/NASA, Ref. X8,X9,X10) space stations.
Early US measurements of the environment were oriented exclusively towards
meteoroids, as might be expected, given the relatively insignificant human traffic
at that time. Explorer I, the first American satellite, carried piezoelectric
microphones and wire grid detectors which recorded the impacts of small solid
particles. Explorer XIII, XVI, XXIII and 46 were dedicated missions to measure
the micrometeoroid environment using a variety of sensor technologies.
Pegasus 1-3, the instrumented Saturn IV third stages of several Apollo
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boilerplate models, also measured micrometeoroid (and most likely debris)
impacts upon large extensible panels. From these measurements, as well as
those of sensors mounted about Lunar and interplanetary probes, models of the
sporadic micrometeoroid environment were developed. Ground-based
photographic and radar observations of meteors formed the primary data source
for models of the stream meteoroid environment. The meteoroid portion of the
space environment is considered to be relatively well characterized by computer
models at this time. These are useful in discriminating meteoroids from orbital
debris.
Modern in-situ measurements of the solid particle environment have
concentrated upon the analysis of materials returned from space. These
measurement’s debris component is isolated by subtracting meteoroid impacts
from the total impact record. This may be accomplished in a statistical sense
using the meteoroid environment models described previously or in a
deterministic sense by scanning electron microscopy and element analysis of the
residue found in the impact crater. Typically, meteoroid craters possess element
compositions quite different from those caused by man-made orbital debris.
Materials from the Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF), the European
Recoverable Carrier (EURECA), the Solar Maximum Mission (SMM), Westar 6,
and Palapa B have all contributed to an understanding of the environment; SMM
and LDEF have been the primary and most analyzed sources. With the
exception of the mildly elliptical orbits of the stranded Westar and Palapa
communication satellites, however, all analyzed surfaces were exposed at or
below approximately 500 km altitude. No consistent, long-term in-situ
measurements of the environment above 500 km altitude (including both the
remainder of LEO and the GEO belt) have been made.
However, recent progress in measuring the small particle environment has been
made with the US’ ARGOS satellite (elliptical orbit) and the European Space
Agency’s GORID sensor (GEO).
Modeling and characterization
Protection
The protection of a space asset may take the form of either passive or active
means. Passive means are those performed during the design process and
typically incorporate either dedicated shielding, or the placement of internal and
external components in such a manner as to benefit from collateral shielding by
adjacent components.
Passive Spacecraft Shielding
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Active Collision Avoidance
At the present time, several important US national and international assets are
continuously monitored for collision avoidance (COLA) maneuver planning
purposes. Most prominent are the manned National Space Transportation
System (STS, the “Space Shuttle”) and the International Space Station (ISS).
The USSTRATCOM is the responsible agency for these activities, and in fact
maintains a dedicated workstation capability for this activity. COLA activities
utilize SP element sets [q.v.] and a projection period of three (3) days to provide
a long-range forecast of close approaches, or conjunctions. Should a
conjunction be predicted, USSTRATCOM notifies NASA JSC Mission
Control/Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) and maneuver planning is
implemented. The following sections describe current best practice in planning
activities related to maneuvering the STS and ISS.
National Space Transportation System (STS)
The US STS orbiter vehicle (OV) was the first space vehicle to institute active
collision avoidance practices. This practice is predicated upon the penetration of
a volume or volumes centered on the position of the STS OV by an RSO.
Candidate collision objects (represented by their TLEs) are initially screened by
apogee/perigee to determine if they would be capable of colliding with STS under
any circumstances; for example, objects in circular orbit at 1450 km altitude were
excluded at this stage, since they could never interact with the much lower STS
orbit. Objects predicted to enter or cross the volume would draw attention to
these objects, resulting in increased tasking of the SSN sensors to obtain better,
more timely element sets, and the processing of these sets using
USSPACECOM special perturbations (numerical integration) orbit propagator
models. If the object continued to be predicted to enter the volume, the SSN
would notify NASA so as to initiate planning for a collision avoidance maneuver.
Between 1989, when the procedure was implemented, and February 1994, four
such notifications were received and the STS maneuvered three times. This
discrepancy in number is due to the manner in which the maneuver planning was
implemented: maneuvers would be conducted only if such a maneuver doesn’t
compromise either the primary payload or mission objectives, which remains a
qualitative decision on the part of STS management. In those cases involving a
maneuver, the STS required approximately 45 minutes to plan and perform the
maneuver.
The STS has historically used tiered threat ellipsoids (up to the mid-1990s) and
later “boxes” (mid-1990s to 2000) arranged about, and centered on, the nominal
position of the STS orbiter vehicle. Boxes (parallelepipeds) replaced ellipsoids
due to their easier mathematical implementation and manipulation for COLA
calculations. The introduction of boxes also coincided with the introduction of the
concepts of an “alert” box and a “conjunction” box, the latter also being referred
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to as the “coffin”. The coffin’s dimensions replicated the dimensions of the
previous threat ellipsoid, i.e. 10 km (down-track) x 4 km (radial) x 4 km (crosstrack). The alert box doubled these dimensions. Extensive analyses conducted
at NASA JSC and supported by the USSTRATCOM have recently (2000)
promoted a revision to the dimensions of the boxes. Currently, the dimensions of
the conjunction box are 14 km x 14 km (cross-track and down track directions) x
2 km (radial direction). The alert box has expanded to dimensions of 40 x 40 km
(down-track and cross-track) x 10 km (radial direction). Due to the “squashed”
nature of this box, it is sometimes referred to colloquially as a “pizza box”, after
the flat boxes used for home delivery pizza.
The STS orbit determination software did not generate variance/covariance
information. Thus, STS conjunction predictions remained “deterministic” in the
sense that any predicted conjunction, i.e. a penetration of the pizza box, signaled
that a maneuver should be planned and a maneuvering burn by the on-board
Orbital Maneuvering System (OMS) be performed. Modern collision avoidance
analyses have indicated that this strategy is ineffective in calculating the true
probability of collision. For example, the interaction of the collision box and the
uncertainty in position of space debris objects did not correctly portray the
geometrical relationship between these volumes and the evolution of the
positional uncertainty over time. For this reason, the STS has recently adopted
(Foster, personal comm., 2001) a methodology derived originally for the
International Space Station (ISS).
International Space Station (ISS)
The ISS has adopted a more modern computational strategy by incorporating a
mature implementation of time-varying ISS and space debris uncertainty
estimates. The positions of objects are described in terms of state vectors,
variance/covariance matrices, and propagation over time using special
perturbation element set data and propagation software. This process tends to
reduce the number of potential conjunctions as compared to previous strategies.
At the current time, the ISS utilizes a single pizza box with dimensions of 40 x 40
km (down-track and cross-track directions) x 10 km (radial direction) as a single,
alert box. Should an object penetrate this box and possess a probability of
collision of 10-4 or greater, maneuver planning shall be implemented.
If a maneuver is possible (given time-acceleration constraints), the ISS will
maneuver to evade the predicted conjunction. Mission success criteria have not
influenced ISS maneuver strategy, as it has the STS, due to the ISS being in the
construction phase. However, reduction of maneuvers to four of less per year,
assuming the maneuvers to occur approximately every 90 days such that
microgravity experiments may reasonably be expected to come to fruition before
a maneuver is executed, has long been a programmatic goal. Therefore, mission
success criteria may become important to the decision-making process in the
future.
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Remediation
The Legal Regime

Conclusions
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Appendix A
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Appendix B
Space Situational Awareness via Space Surveillance
World Space Surveillance Systems
United States of America
The US space surveillance system is the US Strategic Command’s
(USSTRATCOM) Space Surveillance Network (SSN). The SSN is a global
network of radar and electro-optical surveillance sensors and gives the
USSTRATCOM the ability to detect, track, identify and catalog all man-made
resident space objects (RSOs) down to a threshold size. The USSTRATCOM is
a unified command within the US military, i.e. it is composed of (US) Air Force
Space Command (AFSPC), the Naval Space Command (NAVSPACECOM), the
(US) Army Space Command (USARSPACE), and other contingents, including a
Canadian contingent under the auspices of US-Canadian agreements related to
defense of the North American continent. The principal components of the SSN
are depicted in the following wire diagram.
USSTRATCOM

AFSPC

th

NAVSPACECOM

th

14 Air Force

20 Air Force

Alternate Space Control Center
(ASCC) ASSET

st

21 Space Wing

st

1 Command &
Control Squadron
(1CACS)

Space
Control
Center (SCC)
ASSET

reporting

tasking

Dedicated Sensors

Collateral Sensors

Space Surveillance
Network (SSN)
ASSET

Contributing Sensors

SPASUR Fence
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The Space Control Center (SCC) and the 1st Command & Control Squadron
(1CACS) are co-located in Colorado Springs, Colorado, USA, as indicated by
being contained in the dotted box at left. The Alternate SCC is located at the
Headquarters NAVSPACECOM in Dahlgren, Virginia, USA. The ASCC is a less
robust version of the SCC, and may serve to off-load certain activities of the SCC
during intensive periods of activity. Finally, the SSN itself is composed of
dedicated sensors, collateral sensors, and contributing sensors. Dedicated
sensors refer to those sensors controlled by USSTRATCOM and dedicated to
the space surveillance rôle, i.e. direct SSN support. Collateral sensors are those
controlled by USSTRATCOM but dedicated to other, non-SSN support activities.
The contributing sensors are non-USSTRATCOM controlled sensors whose
primary activity is not SSN support yet provide occasional support under contract
or interagency agreement with USSTRATCOM. Dedicated sensors consist of
those operated by NAVSPACECOM (the so-called Naval Space Surveillance
[NAVSPASUR] SPASUR “fence”) and by AFSPC (all remaining dedicated
sensors). The SSN is detailed further in the table below.
Sensor

Sensor
Desig.

Rng
Type

Collector Type

Operating
spectrum

Mission
Support

Antigua

ANT

NE

Radar (Mechanical Tracker)

C band

Collateral

Ascension

ASC

NE

Radar (Mechanical Tracker)

C band

Collateral

Beale – PAVE
PAWS

BLE

NE

Solid State Phased Array Radar
(SSPAR)

UHF

Collateral

Cape Cod – PAVE
PAWS

COD

NE

SSPAR

UHF

Collateral

Cavalier – PARCS

CAV

NE

Radar PA

UHF

Collateral

Clear – BMEWS

CLR

NE

3 Detection Radars & 1 Tracking
Radar

UHF

Collateral

Diego Garcia GEODSS

DGC

DS

E-O

Visible

Dedicated

Eglin

EGL

NE/DS

Radar PA

UHF

Dedicated

Fylingdales BMEWS

FYL

NE

SSPAR

UHF

Collateral

GLOBUS II

GLO

NE/DS

Radar (Mechanical Tracker)

X band

Dedicated

Haystack Aux LSSC

HAX

NE/DS

Radar (Mechanical Tracker)

Ku band

Contributing

Haystack LRIR LSSC

HAY

NE/DS

Radar (Mechanical Tracker)

X band

Contributing

Kaena Point

KAE

NE

Radar (Mechanical Tracker)

C band

Collateral

Kwajalein –
ALCOR

ALC

NE

Radar (Mechanical Tracker)

UHF

Contributing

Kwajalein –
ALTAIR

ALT

NE/DS

Radar (Mechanical Tracker)

UHF/VHF

Contributing

Kwajalein –
TRADEX

TRX

NE/DS

Radar (Mechanical Tracker)

L & S band

Contributing

Kwajalein – MMW

MMW

NE

Radar (Mechanical Tracker)

mm wave

Contributing

Maui – GEODSS

MAU

DS

E-O

Optical

Dedicated
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Millstone – LSSC

MIL

NE/DS

Radar (Mechanical Tracker)

L band

Contributing

MSSS – 3.7m

AEOS

DS

E-O

Visible

Contributing

MSSS - 1.6m

AMS

DS

E-O

Visible, LWIR

Contributing

MSSS - 1.2m

MOT

DS

E-O

Visible, LWIR

Contributing

MSSS - .8m

BDT

DS

E-O

Visible

Contributing

MSX/SBV

MSX

NE/DS

E-O

Visible

Dedicated

NAVSPACECOM
Detection Fence

NAV

NE/DS

Radar (Detection
Fence/Interferometer)

CW UHF

Dedicated

Socorro –
GEODSS

SOC

DS

E-O

Visible

Dedicated

Shemya

SHY

NE

Radar PA

L band

Contributing

Thule

THU

NE

SSPAR

UHF

Collateral

Herein, each sensor is described by name, three-letter designator, sensor range
profile, sensor type, and sensor category. Sensor range is defined as either/or
Near Earth (NE) or Deep Space (DS). Near Earth RSOs are those with periods
of 225 minutes or less (corresponding to semimajor axis altitudes of
approximately 5876 km or less) while DS RSOs are of course the remainder of
the RSOs. In terms of sensor type, mechanical trackers are the classic “dish”type radars which acquire and track objects by pointing and steering the dish.
Phased array radars (PAR) utilize electromagnetic beam steering to sweep the
sky, and thus can search a significantly greater volume of space as compared to
the beam (colloquially termed a “pencil beam” to give some idea of its relative
diameter to “length” dimensions) generated by a mechanically-steered radar.
The “E-O” sensors are electro-optical telescopic sensors. Other pertinent
acronyms are the Moron Optical Space Surveillance (MOSS) sensor, the Lincoln
Space Surveillance Center (LSSC), Midcourse Science Experiment (MSX)
Space-Based Visible (SBV) optical sensor, the Ground-based Electro-Optical
Deep space Surveillance System (GEODSS), the Millimeter Wave (MMW) radar
located at US Army Kwajalein Atoll (USAKA), the Maui (Hawaii) Space
Surveillance Site (MSSS), the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Attack
Characterization System (PARCS) PAR, and the various Ballistic Missile Early
Warning Sites (BMEWS). Radar operating frequency bands are as tabulated
below.
BAND DESIGNATION
Very High Frequency (VHF)
Ultra High Frequency (UHF)
L
S
C
X
Ku
mm wave
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50-300 MHz
300-1000 MHz
1-2 GHz
2-4 GHz
4-8 GHz
8-12 GHz
12-18 GHz
40-100+ GHz
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In general, the smallest object diameter “d” (or characteristic length, [m])
detectable by a given radar is on the order of:
d=

c
,
2pf

where “c” is the speed of light (~ 3 x 108 [m/s]) and f is the frequency [Hz] quoted
in the table above. Note, however, that this is extremely dependent upon target
characteristics (both physical and geometrical), sensor processing/noise
threshold(s), target minimum range, etc. Deep space tracking relies primarily
upon optical tracking, and as such is similarly dependent upon target albedo (or
reflectivity) and other characteristics as above, phase function, etc. The relative
efficiency of one type of sensor (radar or E-O) lies in the relative dependencies of
“target signal returned to the sensor”, S, to range. In general,
S radar µ

1
1
, S E -O µ 2 ,
4
r
r

where r is the range from sensor to target object. Because the signal strength
returned drops off faster with range for radars than for E-O sensors, radars
historically have predominated in NE data collection, while E-O sensors have
collected the majority of DS data. Note, however, that several radars (e.g. Eglin,
and the Haystack LRIR and Millstone radars) have traditionally deployed a
significant DS capability.
The SSN is portrayed in the following figure. Coverage indicated is for objects at
800 km clearing the local (topocentric) sensor horizon. Blue indicates the
coverage pattern of radar sensors while red indicates the coverage pattern of
electro-optical sensors. Several points must be made here. Though both sensor
types are patterned for 800 km orbits, the higher minimum elevation of the optical
sensors reduces the effective maximum coverage area. Furthermore, the areas
portrayed in this figure are, with the exception of PARs, the maximum coverage
areas. Neither mechanically-steered radars or electro-optical sensors, both
being bore-sighted instruments, can observe more than a tiny fraction of the
depicted spatial volume at any one time. Only PARs, and the Naval
interferometer fence, can survey the total areas indicated over the course of a
few-second sweep time or instantaneously (in the case of the fence).
Several salient features are apparent in this figure. Firstly, the global nature of
the SSN becomes apparent. Secondly, one notes that the electro-optical
sensors (DS sensors) are located at latitudes closer to the equator than other
sensor types; this is because telescopes offer better deep space performance
than radars and the majority of DS objects are at low inclinations or in the
Geosynchronous belt. Despite the global coverage, the paucity of NE sensors at
low latitudes limits the detection probability of low inclination objects or objects in
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DS transfer orbits. Tracking of objects in GTO and those RSOs subject to the
so-called “Southern Perigee Anomaly” (highly elliptical orbits with perigees in the
southern hemisphere) are difficulties arising as a consequence of this
geographical distribution.

Fig. A-1: US SSN sensor assets.
Blue: RADAR sensor coverage at 800 km altitude; Red: E-O sensor coverage at
800 km altitude. See preceding text for discussion. Miller cylindrical projection.
One sensor is not portrayed here. The Midcourse Science Experiment (MSX)
satellite’s Space-Based Visible (SBV) telescope is on orbit, and provides
(primarily) Deep Space observations to the SCC. The MSX/SBV has proven the
utility and flexibility of space-based optical space surveillance. This is important
in terms of the potential decreasing available of foreign sites for ground-based
sensors. As well, the SBV optical sensor is not subject to the vagaries of
weather and the limited duty cycle of ground-based E-O sensors.
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Data Processing
Numerical Processing
Two orbit determination and processing techniques are utilized by the
USSTRATCOM. These may be referred to as General Perturbations (GP) and
Special Perturbations (SP). USSTRATCOM also has other propagation routines
on hand, e.g. the Semi-Analytic Liu Theory (SALT), and the reader should note
that the Naval Space Command utilizes a different set of analytic, semi-analytic,
and numerical integration-based orbit determination and propagation software.
GP processing utilizes the orbital dynamic theories of Kozai (Simplified GP
model, or SGP) or Brouwer (SGP version 4, or SGP4), with modifications to
include atmospheric drag, to perform orbit determination (including linear least
squares differential correction) and element set generation. A proposed upgrade
in the mid 1980s, utilizing the dynamic theory of Hoots (SGP version 8, or SGP8)
was not proceeded with, though one will encounter references to it occasionally.
Modifications to include third-body perturbations resulted in the Deep Space
module for each propagator, e.g. SDP or SDP4. During processing, the Deep
Space modules will be called should the period of the object(s) being propagated
exceed 225 minutes. Backward compatibility with SGP/SDP has been
maintained (see the discussion of element set format) because of computational
limitations at many SSN sites as well as a large user community. At the present
time, GP orbit determination within USSTRATCOM has been superseded by SP
techniques in toto; GP remains in use, however, for creating the orbital elements
sets issued by USSTRATCOM for public release.
SP processing is based upon numerical integration of the equations of motion,
coupled with perturbation force models. Principal features of the SP processing
may be summarized succinctly as follows:
•
•

•

Geopotential: user-selected; usually smaller than 36x36, although
capability to utilize higher fidelity is available
Atmosphere: Jacchia-USSTRATCOM model with 10.7 cm Solar radio
flux (F10.7) and Geomagnetic indices updated every six hours (in
theory), though more likely every 24 hours (in practice), as the relevant
databases are updated.
Third-body perturbations: sun and moon, with a Geopotential smaller
than 36x36.

Additional options, such as variable integration (time) step, are available. In
practice, SP orbit determination requires that the users of SP data be informed
as to every option utilized to process a particular observation, else the models
used for orbit determination (USSTRATCOM) and propagation (the user) would
differ. Within a given catalog, one may encounter two or more “different” SP
models used, depending upon the circumstances of the differential correction
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process applied (e.g. automatic vs. manual), the last update’s epoch and sensor
tasking priority, and other factors.
The Data Stream
As of a decade ago, the SSN was regularly processing over 50 000 observations
per day; this load has increased, with existing sensors, over the course of the
1990s, and may be expected to increase further as (a) the on-orbit environment
grows and (b) sensor capability upgrades decrease threshold detection sizes or
extend observational capability to objects difficult to track with radar alone.
At the present time, approximately 80-90% of the catalog is updated using an
automated differential correction process. For these objects, the updating is a
near real-time process. The remainder require human intervention and are thus
dependent upon manpower levels, tasking, priority, etc. Those objects failing this
process are carried along as Uncorrelated Targets (UCTs) awaiting further
confirmation in the form of additional observations by one or more sensors. In
certain cases, objects have been discovered, or recovered after long periods of
being lost, by the human analysis of long series of UCTs; twelve provisional
fragmentation or anomalous events, one dating to December 1965, have been
tentatively identified in this fashion in the last year. All were in difficult-to-track
orbits (Geosynchronous transfer), possessed unusual physical characteristics,
e.g. high ballistic/radiation pressure area-to-mass ratios, or both.
Not all state vector/element sets (“elsets”) generated by the USSTRATCOM are
transmitted to external sites, primarily the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center
(GSFC) Orbital Information Group (OIG). Rather, those elsets determined to be
“sufficiently different” from the preceding elsets only are transmitted. This
operational technique was established to minimize traffic over what can only be
considered antiquated transmission lines. Actual transmission criteria are a
function of orbit type; there is no single criteria applied to the entire catalog. To
cite specific examples, a low altitude and/or high-drag satellite will have more
elsets transmitted per unit time than a relatively stable orbit of a satellite at 1500
km altitude. There is no relationship between the USSTRATCOM criteria for
“attention” and “lost” objects and update criteria. However, if an elset is not
updated within an internally specified time, tasking to the SSN sensors will be
increased in an effort to update the object’s orbital elements. If an elset has not
been updated for 30 days, the object is considered “hard lost” and other
techniques, e.g. NAVSPASUR fence searches and UCT processing, will be
applied in an effort to reacquire the object.
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The figure below presents a general outline of observation processing from initial
observation to catalog entry update.

Tasking
list
observations

Y
Corr. w/
catalog?

USSTRATCOM
Space Control
Center (SCC)
Cheyenne Mountain
Air Force Station,
Colorado,
USA

N
Y
Corr. w/ analyst
elset catalog?
N

Assign an
available
analyst catalog
number

Y

Corr. w/ local
UCT catalog?

N
Maintain in UCT
catalog; assign new
catalog number

Fig. A-2: observational data evolution.
Automated orbit determination, track to track correlation, and cataloging activities
account for updates to approximately 80-90% of the catalog at any given time.
This process operates in near real-time. The remainder of the catalog require
human intervention. This action may be necessitated by object maneuvers, high
ballistic/radiation pressure area-to-mass ratios, or a breakup event. For these
cases, hours to days may elapse before a quality state vector/element set can be
built and distributed. Particularly in the case of fragmentation cataloging, the
limitations imposed by the inherent quality of a given observation coupled with
the need to correlate observations from track to track and avoid cross-tagging or
other misidentification of the new object requires a significant effort on the part of
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analysts. This task may be eased somewhat if the fragmenting body was in a
unique or rarely utilized orbital regime (altitude or inclination) but is complicated
for bodies in low inclination and/or high eccentricity orbits, or for orbits
experiencing significant perturbations. For example, the fragmentation of the
Long March 4 CBERS-1/SACI-1 rocket body in 2000 was a “clean” breakup (in
analyst terminology) in that debris objects were well tracked initially, there was
little opportunity for cross-tagging or misidentification, the event was at relatively
low altitude, and other factors. Conversely, “dirty” breakups, such as the series
of LANDSAT Delta rocket body fragmentations, are prone to cross-tagging and
misidentification or misallocation to one of the three specific rocket bodies which
fragmented. Several debris objects associated with these events have never
entered the publicly available catalog. In certain cases, only long-term drag
effects have rendered debris capable of entering the catalog; an example is
provided by object 1961-015MM. This object, debris created during the 1961
fragmentation of this mission’s Able-Star rocket body, only entered the catalog in
the early 1990s.
Planned and Potential SSN Upgrades
Recent changes in the SSN have resulted in increased capabilities. Examples
are provided by the recent (2000-2001) restoration of the Shemya-based Cobra
Dane phased array radar to space surveillance activities and changes to
Uncorrelated Target (UCT) processing at the AN/FPS-85 phased array radar at
Eglin AFB. Optical sensors, such as those at the Maui Space Surveillance Site,
also continue to be updated with new technology. Additional changes and
upgrades to the SSN are expected to take place over the next two decades.
Perhaps of primary interest would be the proposed upgrade of the Naval fence
from UHF frequencies (~ 216 MHz) to a higher operating frequency; this would
significantly improve this dedicated sensor’s accuracy and ability to observe,
track, and catalog smaller objects.
Data Format
Several formats are maintained by the SCC. These may be broadly defined as
being of either a Cartesian state vector format or a Keplerian mean element set
format. The latter includes the commonly encountered Two Line Element (TLE)
set format, which will be described in detail.
Stave Vector (SV) Format
Two state vector formatted data produces are produced for special distribution by
USSTRATCOM. The first is a (numerical) double precision state vector for a
given satellite, generated using Special Perturbation (SP) theory, and the second
is a satellite ephemeris for specified RSOs generated using either General
Perturbation (GP) or SP theory.
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The double precision state vector is defined as tabulated below. The reference
frame is either Earth Centered Inertial (ECI) or Earth Fixed Greenwich (EFG).
ITEM
Satellite number
Epoch revolution
Epoch Time
X position component
Y position component
Z position component
XDOT velocity component
YDOT velocity component
ZDOT velocity component
Bterm drag coefficient

UNITS/COMMENTS
None
Revolution number at epoch/ascending node crossing
(last two digits of year)(fractional day of year)
km
km
km
km/s
km/s
km/s
2
m /kg (= 1/2CDA/m)

A second, larger “state vector” format is computed for special activities such as
impact point prediction and combination of miss between orbits (COMBO)
calculations. It is generated using SP processing and is essentially identical to
the Satellite Ephemeris format. Satellite ephemeris data is defined below.
Reference frames are either ECI or EFG. The (U,V,W) coordinate frame is
defined such that the U axis is in the orbit radial direction, V is in the orbit downtrack direction, and W is in the cross-track direction, or the direction of the orbital
angular momentum vector.
ITEM
Date/time
Satellite number
Epoch revolution
Ephemeris type
Geodetic latitude LAT
East longitude LONG(E)
Altitude (HEIGHT)
Ground speed (VEL)
Heading (AZ)
Flight path angle (GAM)
Orbital Elements
Semimajor axis (A)
Eccentricity (E)
Inclination (I)
Right ascension of ascending node
Argument of Perigee
True argument of latitude
Satellite Ephemeris
X position component
Y position component
Z position component
XDOT velocity component
YDOT velocity component
ZDOT velocity component
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UNITS/COMMENTS
Epoch time of ephemeris
None
Revolution number at epoch/ascending node
crossing
“0” for data distributed outside of USSTRATCOM
Degrees
Degrees
km
km/s
degrees
degrees, measured with respect to local horizontal
km
none
degrees
degrees
degrees
degrees
km
km
km
km/s
km/s
km/s
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Error Ellipsoid
Semi-axis Magnitudes (3)
Spherical error (95% confidence)
U largest (U component of unit vector in
the direction of the largest semi-axis)
U smallest (U component of unit vector
in the direction of the smallest semi-axis)
U autre (U component of unit vector in
the direction of the remaining semi-axis)
V largest (as defined above)
V smallest
V autre
W largest
W smallest
W autre
Position variance/covariance matrix
sUU
sUV
sUW
sVU
sVV
sVW
sWU
sWV
sWW

km
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None

Note that while the orbit determination software calculates the elements of the
3x3 variance/covariance matrix for both position and velocity, only the position
matrix is available as a data product.
Element Set Format
Various multi-line element set formats have evolved over the course of the Space
Age. These are described as being of “N lines” in format due to a heritage
derived from IBM punch card data storage nomenclature. For example, the
modern Two Line Element (TLE) set was originally stored on two punch cards;
the “line” is the lineal descendent of an individual “card”. Thus, in certain older
publications the reader will note references to “two card” or “three card” formats.
The former is the ancestor of the modern TLE and is also referred to as the
Transmission or T format. The latter is referred to as (USSTRATCOM) Internal
or G format, and in fact four- and five-line formats exist and are processed and
delivered to various customers. The format of the TLE set is tabulated below.
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ITEM
Satellite number
Classification
International Designator
Epoch Time

FORMAT/ VALUES

UNITS

00001-69999
U
YYNNNAAA

None
“U” indicates an Unclassified elset
(last two digits of year)(launch
number within year)(alphabetic
piece tag A-ZZZ)
(last two digits of year)(fractional
day of year)

YYDDD.DDDDDDDD

First derivative of mean
motion with respect to time,
divided by two (2)
Second derivative of mean
motion with respect to time,
divided by six (6)
Drag coefficient B*

Revolutions/day

±(.)NNNNN±N

revolutions/day (decimal place
understood)
-1
(Earth radii) (decimal place
understood)
“0” indicates a TLE generated using
the SGP4/SDP4 orbital model
(usually) incremented every time an
elset is updated
None
Degrees

±(.)NNNNN±N

Ephemeris type

0

Element number

NNNN

Check-sum (error checking)
Inclination i
Right Ascension of
Ascending Node W
Eccentricity e
Argument of Perigee w
Mean Anomaly M
Mean Motion n
Epoch revolution

2

±.NNNNNNNN

N
NNN.NNNN
NNN.NNNN
(.)NNNNNNN
NNN.NNNN
NNN.NNNN
NN.NNNNNNNN
NNNNN

3

Degrees
None (decimal place understood)
Degrees
Degrees
revolutions/day
Revolution number at
epoch/ascending node crossing

A TLE set contains positional information for a given satellite and is currently
transmitted as a General Perturbations (GP) element set (“elset”). In this elset
format, the mean motion has been modified (referred to as being “Kozai’d”) to be
compatible with the Kozai Theory-based Simplified General Perturbations (SGP)
astrodynamics model. The SGP4 model further modifies this format (i.e. deKozai’s or un-Kozai’s) to express the mean motion in its original Brouwer Theory
form. The two theories of orbit propagation utilize two different pseudo-drag
coefficients. In the case of SGP propagation, drag is characterized by a series
expansion of the rate of change of the mean motion n over some time interval Dt
≡ ti+1 - ti, viz:

n&ˆ
Ê n&ˆ
Ê&
n i +1 = n i + Á ˜ ⋅ Dt + Á ˜ ⋅ Dt 2 + ...
Ë 2 ¯i
Ë 6 ¯i
Due to the (relatively) frequent element set updating, the series expansion is
truncated at the second derivative of n with respect to time. The coefficients of
the Dt terms are contained in the TLE for SGP theory propagation. SGP4
propagation is effected using the pseudo-drag coefficient B* (pronounced “B
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star”). This drag coefficient incorporates not only atmospheric drag, but indeed
serves as a fit parameter in the orbit determination/update process. Therefore,
this term may also incorporate effects due to sensor bias, unmodeled force terms
(e.g. solar radiation pressure and atmospheric perturbations), variation in the
drag coefficient CD, RSO maneuvers, etc. B* [1/Earth radii] is theoretically
related to the ballistic coefficient B [m2/kg] and the RSO area-to-mass ratio (A/m)
by the following equations:

B* =

r0
⋅B
2

B =

1
A
⋅ CD ⋅
2
m

where r0 is a constant atmospheric density equal to 2.461x10-5 [kg/m2/Earth
radii], CD is the dimensionless drag coefficient, A is the cross-sectional area
presented to the atmosphere [m2], and m is the RSO mass [kg]. The drag
coefficient of the “average RSO” is usually assumed to be on the order of 2.0 –
2.2. The reader is cautioned that difference publications define the ballistic
coefficient in different manners, i.e. some include the factor of 1/2, some define B
as the mass-to-area ratio, etc.
The epoch time is defined such that 0.00h UT on 1 January of a given year (i.e.
the midnight between 31 December and 1 January) is day-of-year 1.00000000,
not 0.00000000, i.e. the elapsed time starts at 1 day rather than 0 days. Unlike
the Julian day, TLE epoch times start at midnight UT rather than noon of a given
day. Finally, TLE time is measured in mean solar days (1440 minutes duration)
rather than sidereal days (1436 minutes duration). This can sometimes lead to
confusion, as the SSC catalog (manifested as the publicly available monthly
NASA GSFC OIG’s “Satellite Situation Report”) utilizes sidereal days.
The international designator is defined under United Nation conventions, and
consists of a launch year, the numerical sequence of a given launch within the
year, and an alphabetic piece tag. The piece tag is a character from A through Z,
with the letters “I” and “O” omitted due to their possible confusion with the
numerals 1 and 0 (zero), respectively. Piece tag “A” is usually assigned to the
primary payload (or the first cataloged payload), “B” to a second payload or the
rocket body, etc. The primary payload of the third launch of 2001 would
therefore have an international designator of (20)01-003A. Should more than 24
pieces be associated with a given launch (for example, in the case of a
fragmentation event), the piece tag is augmented by a second tag field. Thus,
the 25th and 27th objects associated with this launch would be afforded
international designators 2001-003AA and 2001-003AC, respectively. Should
more than 600 pieces be generated (i.e. tags “A” through “ZZ” have been
assigned), a third tag field would be added. Piece 601 would be assigned piece
tag AAA, piece 604 would be assigned piece tag AAD, etc. A third field has been
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necessitated only once, as over 700 trackable pieces were associated with the
fragmentation of the STEP II rocket body, a Pegasus Hydrazine Auxiliary
Propulsion Stage (HAPS). Prior to 1963, a Greek letter designator was applied
in lieu of the launch sequence number, and a numerical identifier was applied in
lieu of the alphabetic piece tag. Thus, 1961-015C is equivalent to 1961-o3
(omicron 3).
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
The CIS (Russian) space surveillance network corresponding to the US SSN is
the Russian Space Surveillance Service (RSSS), as usually referred to in the
West, or the Outer Space Monitoring System (SKKP -- Sistema kontrolya
kosmicheskogo prostranstva), to use its Russian title. The RSSS/SKKP is a
subordinate command of the CIS Space Troops. Organization detail similar to
that presented for the SSN isn’t available for the RSSS. However, a general
outline of the RSSS activity and cataloging process is possible based on publicly
available data and presentations by RSSS representatives; this is presented in
the following diagram.
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Space Surveillance System (RSSS)
Tracking Facilities
Primary data processing
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New orbit
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parameters

Y
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Space Object (SO)
inserted in catalog

N

Fig. A-3: wire diagram depicting general element set processing scheme utilized
by the Russian Space Surveillance Service (RSSS).
Also, several papers presented in the 1990s describe the sensors available to
the RSSS. These are described below.
Sensor Site
Abustumani
(Georgia)
Alma Ata
(Kazakhstan)
Ashgabad
(Turkmenia)
Balkhash
(Kazakhstan)
Dushanbe
(Tadjikistan)
Irkutsk (Russia)
Irkutsk (Russia)
Kiev (Ukraine)
Kourovka (Russia)
Mingechaur
(Azerbaijan)

Sensor
Desig.
ABA

Latitude [deg]

Longitude
[deg]

Azimuth Range
[deg]

Sensor Type

42.00

43.00

0-360

Electro-Optical

ALM

43.00

77.00

0-360

Optical

ASH

38.00

58.00

0-360

Electro-Optical

BAL

45.00

74.00

30-330

BMEWS PAR

DUS

39.00

69.00

0-360

Optical

IR1
IR2
KIE
KOU
MIN

53.00
52.00
50.00
57.00
41.00

103.000
100.000
30.00
60.00
48.00

30-300
0-360
0-360
0-360
105-215

BMEWS PAR
Electro-Optical
Optical
Optical
BMEWS PAR
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(Azerbaijan)
Moscow “East”
(Russia)
Moscow “West”
(Russia)
Murmansk (Russia)
Pechora (Russia)
Riga (Latvia)
Sevastopol (Ukraine)
Simeiz (Ukraine)
Uzhgorod (Ukraine)
Uzhgorod (Ukraine)
Yuhno-Sakhalins
(Russia)
Zvenigorod (Russia)

MO1

55.00

37.00

255-305

BMD PAR

MO2

55.00

37.00

65-120

BMD PAR

MUR
PEC
RIG
SEV
SIM
UZ1
UZ2
YUH

68.00
65.00
57.00
44.00
44.00
48.00
49.00
47.00

40.00
57.00
22.00
33.00
34.00
23.00
22.00
143.000

295-355
300-55
220-310
140-260
0-360
165-285
0-360
0-360

BMEWS PAR
BMEWS PAR
BMEWS PAR
BMEWS PAR
Electro-Optical
BMEWS PAR
Optical
Optical

ZVE

56.00

37.00

0-360

Optical

Herein, the acronym BMD indicates the Ballistic Missile Defense radar or radar
system installed around Moscow. These sensors are presented in the next two
figures so as to minimize the unavoidable clutter imposed by the relatively close
geographical proximity of the RSSS sensors.

Fig. A-4: Russian RSSS radar assets.
Radiation patterns at 800 km altitude. Miller cylindrical projection.
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Fig. A-5: Russian RSSS optical sensor assets.
Pattern shown at 800 km altitude. Miller cylindrical projection.
Other space surveillance assets exist within the Former Soviet Union (FSU), e.g.
the “Kobalt” mechanically-steered radar offered for charter or commercial use at
the XVIII meeting of the Inter-Agency Debris coordination Committee (IADC).
However, and in common with the sensors of the RSSS, the actual availability,
serviceability, and current status of these sensors is unknown as of this writing.
For example, more recent references (e.g. Whitmore, P.H., “Red Bear on the
Prowl”, Part 2, Quest 10, no. 1 (2003): 54 ff.) indicate that the PAR sited at Riga,
Latvia, may have been demolished in 1995, though an adjacent radar site may
be operational.
A second caveat associated with the RSSS is associated with the geographic
distribution of RSSS sensors. The Soviet fleet of Space Control ships has been
long retired or converted to commercial maritime purposes; these were primarily
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dedicated to space communications rather than space surveillance, in any case.
As indicated by these figures, the RSSS is located within the confines of the
FSU’s borders. This places concomitantly greater restraints upon the RSSS as
compared to the SSN tracking capability which, for example, manifests itself as
consistently greater breaks in coverage of specific orbits as compared to the
SSN. Thus, a high probability exists that (a) particular orbit classes, e.g. GEO
and other low inclination or highly eccentric orbits are poorly tracked if at all, and
(b) the RSSS catalog of RSOs is not as complete as the corresponding SCC
catalog.
The RSSS collected (as of 1993) approximately 400 000 unique measurements
per day, with approximately 10 000 orbits being updated. Stated accuracies of
the RSSS tracking data are on the order of 4.5 km along track, 0.8 km “binormal
component” (cross track), and 1.5 km in the radial direction. Current capabilities
are unknown.
Availability of Data
As indicated previously, the cognizant Russian authorities have indicated that the
RSSS, as well as other space surveillance-capable sensors such as the Kobalt
radar, are “open for business” in terms of:
1. Informational support of space programs and experiments of concerned
countries.
2. Coordinated operations in contingencies and notification of the concerned
countries about dangerous situations in space and out of space.
3. Control of international agreements related to legal issues of using the near
Earth space.
4. Informational provision for research on the upper atmosphere density
variations.
5. Ecological monitoring of the near Earth space (space contamination control
and analysis of its consequences).
6. Scientific provision of business cooperation mentioned above.
Russian RSSS data are not publicly available, but may be made available on a
commercial data product/service. However, since these items are not publicly
available, and given the caveats previously discussed, this discussion shall be
limited only to a description of the data formats described by Russian
representatives.
Data Format(s)
Several data formats are available from the RSSS. Internal data is believed to
be maintained in state vector format. The format tabulated below (not
guaranteed to be complete; an anomaly angular variable was not described) has
been utilized in several international cooperative activities, such as the Salyut
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7/Cosmos 1686 reentry campaign. Finally, pseudo-TLEs have been provided in
the course of international cooperative studies due to the near-universal nature of
TLEs and the ability of user groups to process them in a standard manner.
ITEM
International Designator

FORMAT/ VALUES

UNITS

YY-NNN-N(NN)

(last two digits of year)(launch
number within year)(numerical
piece tag)
None
(day of month).(month).(last two
digits of year)

Number revolution
Epoch Time 1
Epoch Time 2/epoch of
ascending node passage
(beginning of revolution N)
Nodal period
Change in nodal period
Inclination i
Right Ascension of
Ascending Node W
Parameter of Laplace 1
Parameter of Laplace 2
Eccentricity e
Argument of Perigee w
Ballistic coefficient

NNNNN
DD.MM.YY
HH.mm.ss.ss
NNNNN.NNNNN
± .NNNNN
NNN.NNNN

(hours).(minutes).(fractional
seconds)
minutes
Minutes/revolution
Degrees

NNN.NNNN
.NNNNNNN
.NNNNNNN
.NNNNNNN
NNN.NNNN
.NNNN±N

Degrees
L = e⋅cos(w); unitless
h = e⋅cos(w); unitless
None
Degrees
2
m /kg

Other Space Surveillance Assets
Two additional European assets have the proven capability to track and observe
space objects (including debris). These are the French Navy ship Le Monge and
the FGAN establishment’s radar located in Germany.
Le Monge
The Le Monge is a French Navy laboratory, test, and instrumentation ship
equipped with a meteorological and Laser Radar (LIDAR) station, a telemetry
station, an optical station, and five radar stations. The radar stations are the
Stratus, Gascogne, Savoie, and two Armor installations. These latter two radars
can be used to observe debris, and in fact have supported collision avoidance
activities for the SPOT satellites as early as 1997. The Armor radars are
mechanically-tracked stabilized radars capable of scanning METOP altitudes
above a minimum topocentric elevation of 20°.
Forschungsgesellschaft für Angewandte Naturwissenschaften e.V.
(FGAN)
The FGAN Tracking and Imaging Radar (TIRA), located approximately 30 km
south of Bonn, has a proven capability not only to track debris, but also to
perform imaging of the target under scrutiny. In addition, the mechanically-
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steered TIRA has participated in several international Beam Park Experiments
(BPE) in association with other sensors worldwide. In a BPE, the pencil beam
radar “stares” at a point in space and records objects traversing the beam; these
experiments are useful for (a) providing the debris community validation of
previous and continuing efforts with the LRIR/HAX radars and (b) providing a
snapshot of the debris environment in low Earth orbit.
Orbital Data Provision
NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Orbital Information Group (OIG)
The NASA GSFC OIG is chartered to serve as the distribution center for
USSTRATCOM-derived products. Currently, these data products are the TLEs
and the NASA Satellite Situation Report (analogous to, though a subset of, the
SCC catalog). The ability to download data products electronically is limited and
is characterized by a user level. Base level users are limited in connect time,
total number of TLEs downloaded, and the TLE sorts available. In order to
minimize transmission time, and targeting or marketing to specific user
communities (e.g. the amateur radio operators), TLEs available to a base level
user are categorized by mission or altitude. The entire catalog is not available.
To access the entire catalog, a user must have the so-called “superuser” status.
This entitles the user to download the entire TLE catalog, comprising objects with
catalog numbers in the 1-69999 range. Other user levels and/or Memoranda of
Agreement (MOA) or Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) are required to
access the catalog as well as the analyst catalog (e.g. the 80 000 series of
TLEs). Unfortunately, the completeness of 80 000 series objects maintained by
the OIG (relative to the total analyst set catalog maintained by the SCC) cannot
be guaranteed.
USSTRATCOM
The USSTRATCOM has established procedures whereby Foreign Governments,
Multinational Consortiums, Foreign Launch Agencies, or their US agents or
representatives may request orbital information. Procedures differ slightly
depending upon whether the entity has an existing MOA or MOU in place with
either the USSTRATCOM SCC or NASA.
In the case in which the entity possesses an MOA or MOU with NASA, the data
request is made directly to NASA GSFC under a 1994 MOU between NASA and
USSTRATCOM SCC. NASA will forward the request to USSTRATCOM’s
Cheyenne Mountain Operations Center (CMOC), who will review the request and
justifications and, if granted, supply the data to NASA GSFC for direct
redistribution to the entity.
For the case in which the entity does not possess an MOA or MOU with NASA,
the data request is made from the Foreign Government or entity to the United
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State’s Embassy in the requestor’s country. The embassy forwards the request
and justifications to the US Department of State (DOS). The DOS notifies the
National Military Command Center (NMCC) Deputy Director of Operations
(DDO), the CMOC, and NASA GSFC, and provides approval and release
instructions. Data, if approved, will then be transmitted from either DOS or
directly from NASA GSFC to the requestor.
Certain entities, such as the European Space Agency (ESA), have or will have
MOAs in place with the USSTRATCOM SCC. The MOAs have, or will have,
specific information channels identified by which data, and data content, shall be
provided to an end user or user community.
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Appendix C
US Government Guidelines
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OBJECTIVE
1. CONTROL OF DEBRIS RELEASED DURING NORMAL OPERATIONS
_______________________________________________________________________________
Programs and projects will assess and limit the amount of debris released in a planned manner during normal
operations.

_______________________________________________________________________________

MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES
_______________________________________________________________________________
1-1. In all operational orbit regimes: Spacecraft and upper stages should be designed to
eliminate or minimize debris released during normal operations. Each instance of planned
release of debris larger than 5 mm in any dimension that remains on orbit for more than 25
years should be evaluated and justified on the basis of cost effectiveness and mission
requirements.

OBJECTIVE
2. MINIMIZING DEBRIS GENERATED BY ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSIONS
_______________________________________________________________________________
Programs and projects will assess and limit the probability of accidental explosion during and after
completion of mission operations.

_______________________________________________________________________________

MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES
_______________________________________________________________________________
2-1. Limiting the risk to other space systems from accidental explosions during mission
operations: In developing the design of a spacecraft or upper stage, each program, via failure
mode and effects analyses or equivalent analyses, should demonstrate either that there is no
credible failure mode for accidental explosion, or, if such credible failure modes exist, design
or operational procedures will limit the probability of the occurrence of such failure modes.
2-2. Limiting the risk to other space systems from accidental explosions after completion of
mission operations: All on-board sources of stored energy of a spacecraft or upper stage
should be depleted or safed when they are no longer required for mission operations or
postmission disposal. Depletion should occur as soon as such an operation does not pose an
unacceptable risk to the payload. Propellant depletion burns and compressed gas releases
should be designed to minimize the probability of subsequent accidental collision and to
minimize the impact of a subsequent accidental explosion.
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OBJECTIVE
3. SELECTION OF SAFE FLIGHT PROFILE AND OPERATIONAL
CONFIGURATION
_______________________________________________________________________________
Programs and projects will assess and limit the probability of operating space systems becoming a source of
debris by collisions with man-made objects or meteoroids.

_______________________________________________________________________________

MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES
_______________________________________________________________________________
3-1. Collision with large objects during orbital lifetime: In developing the design and mission
profile for a spacecraft or upper stage, a program will estimate and limit the probability of
collision with known objects during orbital lifetime.
3-2. Collision with small debris during mission operations: Spacecraft design will consider and,
consistent with cost effectiveness, limit the probability that collisions with debris smaller
than 1 cm diameter will cause loss of control to prevent post-mission disposal.
3-3. Tether systems will be uniquely analyzed for both intact and severed conditions.
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OBJECTIVE
4. POSTMISSION DISPOSAL OF SPACE STRUCTURES
_______________________________________________________________________________
Programs and projects will plan for, consistent with mission requirements, cost effective disposal procedures
for launch vehicle components, upper stages, spacecraft, and other payloads at the end of mission life to
minimize impact on future space operations.

_______________________________________________________________________________

MITIGATION STANDARD PRACTICES
_______________________________________________________________________________
4-1. Disposal for final mission orbits: A spacecraft or upper stage may be disposed of by one of
three methods:
a. Atmospheric reentry option: Leave the structure in an orbit in which, using conservative
projections for solar activity, atmospheric drag will limit the lifetime to no longer than 25
years after completion of mission. If drag enhancement devices are to be used to reduce
the orbit lifetime, it should be demonstrated that such devices will significantly reduce
the area-time product of the system or will not cause spacecraft or large debris to
fragment if a collision occurs while the system is decaying from orbit. If a space
structure is to be disposed of by reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere, the risk of human
casualty will be less than 1 in 10,000.
b. Maneuvering to a storage orbit: At end of life the structure may be relocated to one of
the following storage regimes:
I. Between LEO and MEO: Maneuver to an orbit with perigee altitude above 2000
km and apogee altitude below 19,700 km (500 km below semisynchronous altitude
II. Between MEO and GEO: Maneuver to an orbit with perigee altitude above
20,700 km and apogee altitude below 35,300 km (approximately 500 km
above semi-synchronous altitude and 500 km below synchronous
altitude.)
III. Above GEO: Maneuver to an orbit with perigee altitude above 36,100 km
(approximately 300 km above synchronous altitude)
IV. Heliocentric, Earth-escape: Maneuver to remove the structure from Earth orbit,
into a heliocentric orbit.
Because of fuel gauging uncertainties near the end of mission, a program should use a
maneuver strategy that reduces the risk of leaving the structure near an operational orbit
regime.
c. Direct retrieval: Retrieve the structure and remove it from orbit as soon as practical after
completion of mission.
4-2.

Tether systems will be uniquely analyzed for both intact and severed conditions when
performing trade-offs between alternative disposal strategies.
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